The preliminary AD determination resulted in considerably higher margins, from 52.3% to 76.11%. There, the magnitude of the margins was exaggerated by Commerce's use of "adverse facts available" (AFA), 6 which as explained in Part VI(B), infra, making the AD case of little use in further illuminating Commerce practice in AD actions against
Vietnam.
The NME approach, in this instance as it is applied in CVD actions, will be likely continue to bedevil both the Vietnamese Government and Vietnamese exporters to the United States unless and until the United States follows the lead of Mexico (for China) 7 and New Zealand and Australia (for Vietnam) 8 and decides to afford Vietnam market economy treatment for some or all manufacturing sectors before the 2019 WTO deadline.
Such action seems highly unlikely at the present time.
In many respects the NME issue, at least from an economic point of view, is not really whether the Chinese and Vietnamese WTO Accession Protocols legally permit such countries as the United States and the European Union, to treat those countries differently in AD and CVD actions. (The answer is "yes" As discussed infra.) But it makes little economic sense to pretend that there is a clear divide between NMEs and 5 U.S. The major world economies may well be entering an era that portends a major shift away from the "laissez faire" approach to government regulation of and participation in the economy (or lack thereof) that began during the Reagan era in the United States and the Thatcher era in the United Kingdom, and spread elsewhere. In any event, governments' reactions to the "Great Recession" of 2009 suggest that efforts to characterize economies as NME or ME may no longer make economic sense for purposes of applying national unfair trade laws.
Be that as it may, Vietnam and China must deal with the realities of U.S. law and practice, and with the language the two governments accepted when acceding to the 
II. WTO Requirements Governing MNE Treatment for China and Vietnam
Both China and Vietnam were effectively required as a condition of accession to accept special and less favorable treatment with regard to AD and CVD actions by other Members against them. Thus, the use of NME methodology will be virtually impossible to challenge successfully "as such" before the Dispute Settlement Body; whether challenges to such legislation "as applied" will be feasible remains to be seen and are discussed briefly below.
A. China's Accession Agreement
In (d) Once Viet Nam has established, under the national law of the importing WTO Member, that it is a market economy, the provisions of subparagraph (a) shall be terminated provided that the importing Member's national law contains market economy criteria as of the date of accession. In any event, the provisions of subparagraph (a)(ii) shall expire on 31 December 2018. In addition, should Viet Nam establish, pursuant to the national law of the importing WTO Member, that market economy conditions prevail in a particular industry or sector, the non-market economy provisions of subparagraph (a) shall no longer apply to that industry or sector.
The Working Party took note of these commitments.
determining the benefit extended to Vietnamese producers when loans are extended at "preferential" rates and are challenged through national countervailing duty actions. The bulk of the language deals with AD actions, but paragraph 254 clearly applies to both, as in the parallel language accepted earlier by China, and again as with China puts the onus on Vietnam and Vietnamese enterprises to demonstrate ME status in a particular industry sector.
Nevertheless, it may be feasible, depending on the facts and circumstances of 
III. Abandonment of NME Methodology by Mexico and Australia
Recent experience with Mexico, Australia and New Zealand demonstrates that the WTO periods for applying NME methodology are not immutable. In Mexico, a substantial number of the antidumping duties applied to goods imported from China based in part on NME analysis were terminated or scheduled for termination beginning in Commerce believes production and selling costs are determined by market forces. The labor, materials and other costs associated with the production and sale of the same or similar products in those countries are effectively substituted in making the calculations.
In the United States, the factors to be considered in deciding whether a country should be treated as an NME for antidumping purposes are:
i) Extent to which the currency is convertible; ii)
Extent to which wage rates are determined by free bargaining between labor and management; iii)
Extent to which joint ventures or other investments by foreign firms are permitted; iv) Extent of government ownership or control of the means of production; v) Extent of government control over allocation of resources and the pricing and output decisions of enterprises; and vi) Such other factors that Commerce considers appropriate.
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These factors, particularly the catchall paragraph vi), provide the Commerce Department with broad discretion, which Commerce has not been reluctant to utilize, in analyzing NME issues.
The approach taken by the United States in deciding to use the NME However, Commerce also determined that:
c) Government intervention in the economy is Asuch that prices and costs are not a meaningful measure of value;@ d)
The dong is not fully convertible, and is less so than in countries which have recently been determined to be market economies; e)
Foreign direct investment is still controlled by regulation, limitations on corporate form and the flow of the investment throughout the economy, depriving Vietnam of the competitive benefits of FDI; f)
Government pricing committees maintain discretionary control over prices in certain sectors, including those which are not natural monopolies; the government dominates 70-80% of the commercial banking sector; g)
The private sector is excluded from access to resources, because SOEs and the banking sector remain insulated from competition, and are not being privatized; the state sector still accounts for 40% of GDP and 42% of industrial output, and the Asocialist-oriented market economy@ with an active role for SOEs is to be preserved; h) Private land ownership is prohibited and the government is not taking any steps toward a land privatization program; and i)
The rule of law is weak, laws are vague, the judiciary lacks independence, there are few lawyers and trial procedures are Arudimentary@; FIEs prefer arbitration in Singapore. 25 There had clearly been substantial progress in Vietnam toward more free market orientation in many of these categories in recent years, particularly e) and h), but full satisfaction of the technical economic requirements is probably some years away.
Notably, many of the steps Vietnam would be required to implement to convince Commerce on legal grounds to graduate Vietnam to market economy status for antidumping actions are similar to those that Vietnam will need to take to comply fully with its WTO obligations and to assure that the current rapid rate of economic development, job creation and eradication of poverty continues. Interestingly, in the preliminary CVD determination in the Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags proceeding, Commerce effectively reassessed the statutory NME factors in the Vietnam context, but as the basis for rejecting
Vietnamese "commercial" bank loans as a benchmark for calculating the subsidies.
The NME or market-economy determination is political as well as economic in There are obvious conceptual inconsistencies between the use of NME methodology in an anti-dumping case (relying on surrogates because various input costs are not based on market-determined prices), and the assertion that "private industry now dominates many sectors of the Chinese economy" with a much smaller role of government planners, so that government subsidies can be accurately measured, although to some extent Commerce relies on surrogates to determine subsidy benchmarks as well. 37 The court reasoned that unlike the situation in which the dumping duties in parallel AD and CVD proceedings in a market economy are calculated based on normal value and export price, in NME actions the export price is not being compared with the price of the good in the domestic market, but rather, in a surrogate country market which is presumably subsidy-free.
Without adjustment, such a situation could result in double-counting. The Court held that "If Commerce now seeks to impose CVD remedies on the products of NME countries as well [as AD duties], Commerce must apply methodologies that make such parallel remedies reasonable, including methodologies that will make it unlikely that double counting will occur." 38 If the CIT decision after remand to Commerce is upheld by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), some modification of
Commerce's methodology in numerous simultaneous AD/CVD proceedings is inevitable.
China is also challenging the double-counting in an "as such" claim before the WTO, 39 which may provide alternative relief even if the CAFC ultimately reverses the CIT.
The court decision could also require Commerce to quickly develop procedures for analyzing requests for individual market-oriented enterprise treatment, so that the firm could be analyzed under market economy procedures, a deficiency that was also [T]he nature of the Soviet-style economies in the mid 1980s made it impossible for the Department to apply the CVD law. To determine that a countervailable subsidy had been bestowed, the Department needed to establish that: (a) the NME government had bestowed a "bounty or grant" on a producer; and (b) that the bounty or grant was specific. The Soviet-style economies at the time made it impossible to apply these criteria because they were so integrated as to constitute, in essence, one large entity. In such a situation, subsidies could not be separated out from the amalgam of government directives and controls. The current nature of China's economy does not create these obstacles to applying the statute. As noted above, private industry now dominates many sectors of the Chinese economy, and entrepreneurship is flourishing. Foreign trading rights have been given to over 200,000 firms. Many business entities in present-day China are generally free to direct most aspects of their operations, and to respond to (albeit limited) market forces. The role of central planners is vastly smaller. . . Given these developments, we believe that it is possible to determine whether the PRC Government has bestowed a benefit upon a Chinese producer (i.e., the subsidy can be identified and measured) and whether any such benefit is specific. Because we are capable of applying the necessary criteria in the CVD law, the Department's policy that gave rise to the Georgetown Steel litigation does not prevent us from concluding that the PRC Government has bestowed a countervailable subsidy upon a Chinese producer. 54 Thus, Commerce determined that it sufficient discretion to apply CVDs to NMEs under applicable U.S. law (although it was not required to do so), and that it was appropriate to use the CVD laws against China, despite its NME status for AD purposes. This approach has been followed in subsequent cases against China. Commerce reached similar conclusions when it conducted a similar analysis of Vietnam in PRCBs and took the same general approach to CVD cases as with China.
Judging by the actions brought against China, the methodology used by
Commerce to determine whether a benefit is conferred by a particular subsidy uses a mix of methodologies applied to market economies and special rules designed for NMEs. For 53 Id., at 10. 54 Ibid. In dealing with upstream subsidies, in this case pulp log producers, Commerce essentially followed its practice of attributing such subsidies to downstream producers (in this case of paper), as it has in similar cases involving market economies such as Indonesia.
The general approach of Coated Free Sheet Paper has been followed by 
VI. U.S. Methodology and Practice -Vietnam: Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags (PRCBs)
PRCBs is important for a number of reasons. First, it is to date the only proceeding seeking the imposition of CVDs against Vietnamese producers, and just the third seeking antidumping duties. 62 Secondly, in the course of the AD phase of the proceeding Commerce may be required determine whether the Vietnamese producers constitute a market-oriented industry, which in turn may require Commerce to re-evaluate at least in part its application of NME Petitioners alleged as well that various Vietnamese government programs constitute countervailable subsidies. These include preferential lending for exporters; preferential lending for the plastics industry; export promotion programs, export bonus program; new product development program; various income tax benefits for exporters, FIEs, FIEs operating in encouraged industries; and various import tax and VAT exemption programs. 69 All of these were addressed in the preliminary determination.
In the Preliminary determination of subsidies, Commerce essentially agreed with the petitioners, but only after a relatively thorough analysis of Vietnam's present-day economy, with emphasis on the increased economic power of domestic private and foreign invested enterprises while the number of state-owned enterprises ("SOEs") was reduced from 12,000 to about 1,800
and correspondingly reduced employment and total economic output. 70 Commerce also noted significant reforms in SOEs, but with limits on privatization suggesting that the SOE sector will continue indefinitely. Among other factors cited by Commerce as justification for applying CVD laws to Vietnam were the partial deregulation of prices and production inputs and increased participation of Vietnam in the world economy.
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The result is a conclusion that Vietnam's economic space today is a mixed landscape of public, private and foreign ownership. The non-State sector has grown rapidly and accounts fr an increasing share of production, investment employment and trade, although SOEs continue to play a significant role in the economy. However, the economic reforms are incomplete and structural and institutional legacy problems remain.
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While the conclusions are to a considerable degree supported by Commerce's careful analysis, they appear to reflect as well an effort to provide a colourable basis for applying CVD laws while at the same time avoiding to the extent possible erosion of the rationale for treating Vietnam as an NME in antidumping cases. 68 74 Fed. Reg. at 19067. 69 74 Fed. Reg. at 19066-67. 70 CVD Applicability Memo, supra, at 4. Here, as with the China CVD Applicability Memo, supra, Commerce has made a practice of addressing such issues separately from the formal preliminary and final determinations. 71 Id., at 8-9. 72 Id... at 11.
Key Issues in the Preliminary CVD Determination
In its preliminary determination, Commerce for the most part followed the same However, despite the changes, Commerce found, inter alia, many "institutional weaknesses" as well as lack of transparency and continued de facto benefits enjoyed by state owned commercial banks, and observed that the reforms "continue to lag and remain incomplete." 77 In deciding to use a commercial benchmark, Commerce again went beyond the borders of Vietnam. For dong-denominated loans, Commerce put together a basket of currencies relying with some exceptions on the World Bank's list of 54 "lower middle income" countries. 78 In doing so, Commerce preliminarily rejected both the "low income" countries for a variety of reasons, The determination that the plastics industry in Vietnam receives preferential lending was based on an analysis of "targeted" actions taken by state owned commercial banks ("SOCBs") and coordinated by the State Bank of Vietnam rather than on more direct government support.
Commerce determined that "the merchandise under investigation is part of a state targeted, or encouraged, industry or project, and there is evidence that loans from SOCBs are a designated means for developing that industry or project," despite the lack of a "single policy document directing preferential lending . . . ." 82 Since SOCBs were determined to be public entities on the basis of their majority ownership by the government, the loans provided by SOCBs were considered government financial contributions. 83 Because it was the plastics industry that was allegedly targeted, the loans were considered specific under U.S. CVD laws. 84 Using the interest benchmark discussed above Commerce determined that the two producers receiving loans received interest subsidies in the amount of 1.18% ad valorem (Chin Sheng) and 0.21% (Fotai).
Commerce's calculations of whether land was provided to PRCB manufacturers at preferential rates so as to afford a benefit was complicated by its conclusion that "the purchase of land use rights is not conducted in accordance with market principles." 85 Accordingly, and again Among the three Vietnamese PRCB producers individually subject to the investigation, only one (Fotai) leased land for its production facilities directly from the government. The other two leased from private companies (who in turn leased from the government); consequently,
Commerce did not treat the latter two as countervailable, at least in the preliminary determination. Commerce determined preliminarily that the remission of the value added tax on equipment at the time of importation was not to be countervailable, and that a number of export promotion and tax benefit programs were not actionable because the respondents had not used them.
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All such preliminary determinations are subject to verification in Vietnam and to further analysis, so that the final margin rates are subject to change, perhaps significantly, if the CVD investigation, unlike the AD investigation is completed in the normal manner.
B. The Preliminary Determination of Dumping
Unfortunately, the preliminary AD determination in PRCBs provided no discussion of such key issues as choice of surrogate country for factors of production because of the decision to use adverse facts available (AFA). Nor is there likely to be any further analysis of such issues in the final determination; the punitive AFA will be the basis of the final margins there as well.
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However, Commerce confirmed its willingness to use "separate rates" for calculating export price for many Vietnamese respondents but otherwise provided little new guidance as to how it will be administering AD actions against Vietnam.
As is normal practice when there are numerous foreign producers, Commerce selects a small number of major producers as mandatory respondents, in this case API and Fotai
Vietnam. 94 Given that both withdrew abruptly from the proceeding in September and October
2009
, 95 Commerce used as the margin data provided by the petitioners, as the AFA rate. Thus, dumping margins of 76.11%, the highest rate alleged in the petition was assigned to these two firms and for a number of others that did not complete "quantity and value" questionnaires sent to them.
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For the group of respondent enterprises that both completed Q&V questionnaires and made proper requests for separate rate status, the margins were set at 52.3%. In reviewing separate rate requests, Commerce divided the requesters into three groups: producers that were totally foreign owned; joint ventures of foreign and local enterprises or those locally owned by 92 This section discusses only the CVD aspects of the latest "Lumber IV" phase of the dispute the proceedings before the Commerce Department that began 2001. 107 Lumber IV was initiated following the expiration of a settlement agreement 108 A.
Commerce's CVD Investigation
The most significant aspect of Commerce's final CVD determination, 110 more so than the initial subsidy margins of 18.79%, was the position of Commerce on the issue of whether a cross-border price comparison could be used to determine the "benchmark" commercial price for harvested timber to be compared against the allegedly subsidized Canadian provincial government stumpage. The essence of Commerce's position was as follows:
In light of the objective [of the laws and regulations], we agree that a market benchmark prices chosen from the exporting country is preferable to a price chosen from outside the country because it is more likely that such a benchmark will more closely reflect, or be more easily adjusted for, prevailing market conditions in the country of provision in terms of overall price, quality, availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of sale.
However, if there is no market benchmark price available in the country of provision, it is obviously impossible to determine adequacy of remuneration except by reference to sources outside the country.
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Commerce concluded that there were no market-based internal Canadian States, noted earlier, the United States will point to softwood lumber as evidence that the United States is not discriminating against China in its CVD methodology (at least regarding this issue).
In the only other issue of major importance, the Appellate Body upheld Canada's demand that when considering whether alleged subsidies affect certain log and lumber producers it must do a pass-through analysis. Where a timber harvester sells some logs to unrelated sawmills, the Appellate Body concluded that Commerce had improperly failed to conduct a pass-through analysis to determine whether the subsidy to the timber harvesters was passed through to the unrelated purchasers of the logs. However, where the timber harvester process the logs it purchases into softwood lumber, and sells that lumber to other mills for further processing, no pass-through analysis is necessary. In the latter situation, the products of both the timber harvesters and remanufacturers were subject to the investigation, and there is thus no need to analyze pass-through between producers of products subject to the investigation. 116 This reflects treatment of the "upstream subsidies" issue that has been a factor in several Chinese cases.
The United States purported to comply with the WTO determination when it issued its compliance determination 117 but Canada objected that Commerce had failed to carry out the pass-through analysis properly, and had failed to apply that analysis to the first administrative review of the CVD order. The Appellate Body upheld the panel determination that the first review was required to incorporate the pass through analysis and thus was within the scope of the 2005 (Article 21.5) proceedings. 118 With the 2006 settlement agreement, all pending WTO actions concerning softwood lumber were discontinued by consent of both Canada and the United States.
VIII. Conclusion
The preliminary CVD action against Vietnamese PRCB producers furnishes considerable insight as to the precise methodology Commerce will likely use in this and in other CVD investigations against Vietnamese producers in the future, even though this proceeding seems likely to be completed without further participation by the Vietnamese respondents. Nevertheless, the PRCBs preliminary determination indicates that the methodology closely follows that used with regard to China, both with regard to the initial decision to apply the U.S. CVD laws to Vietnam, and in determining which alleged 
